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I cannot be in the company of still active Yale colleagues without having far too
many memories. To suffer reminiscences, Freud noted, is to suffer neurosis, and this
should probably not be inflicted-even on deserving friends! Nor has Fritz Redlich
done anything so drastic, in spite of beingbusted inbronze and hung in portraits, for
us not to celebrate his astonishingly productive present.
I first encountered Redlich's openness to innovation and search in World War II.
Later, almost exactly 30 years ago, as a psychologist studying medicine, I enjoyed
sharing the excitement of learning at Yale about human biology and about both the
depths of the brain and depth psychology. With a provocative dubiety, Milton
Winternitz, the founder of the "Yale system," would challenge students-in his view,
machined products fit only to grind out A's and B's-to think and dare to investigate.
Ideas at Yale were to be actively pursued in the best company available-a range of
experts in every department who were curious and willing to lend a hand in
developing and transferring technologies and science information in what then were
the hardly promising pursuits of the application of biology to psychiatry. The
professorial names ranged from Fulton, MacLean, Livingston, Long, Burr, Pribram,
Gardner, German, Peters, Powers, Jackson, Darrow, Yannet, Hitchcock, Dollard,
Janis, Miller, Delgado, to Barnett, Welch, J. White and-of enormous personal
meaning-Giarman; and so many others. Learning from one's peers as a Yale
student, and from the vantage of a professor-the peerless, regenerating flow ofYale
students, are hallmarks of a Yale education and its science environment. The
inventive and determined nurturance ofthis richly evolving climate ofopportunity is
what indelibly marks Dr. Redlich's long transit at Yale.
We have moved far from that time when-beyond the limits to consciousness and
coma set by energy metabolism-there was no vital chemical link of brain to
behavior, let alone to the psychoses. Today we know brain as a highly differentiated
and specific endocrine and information-generating organ, and of biochemical and
macromolecular sequences in brain function relevant to the pathophysiology of
psychotic states. Yet from an era ofinnocence, we have arrived at a more consequen-
tial ignorance. Like general medicine, we now possess a range ofpotent therapies that
can be all too rapidly and mindlessly implemented, and the biobehavioral infra-
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.structure-the science base underlying their use-is too often uncomprehendingly
ignored, as are the social consequences of technology. Medicines, just as devices, can
be trivialized as conveniences, rather thanfundamentally understood-and respected
as but apart ofthe accountable therapeutic activity ofphysicianly interventions. And
they can be overestimated either as menaces or as the sole magical ingredient of
therapeutics. Thus one is tempted tosay to today's pharmacotherapeutic robots what
a pediatrician long ago expostulated to a surgeon: "For heaven's sake, don't just do
something-stand there!"
Nevertheless, we do have distinct new knowledge to teach and wisely use. I will not
spell out a curriculum or opine on specifically how to teach neurobehavioral sciences
in psychiatry. I, in fact, am uncertain that specifically designed courses are desirable.
We should not, inanyevent, exempt the preclinical sciences from teaching behavioral
biology-for that is, in essence, what biology is all about! Nor would one advocate, in
the teaching of the clinical sciences, the omission of psychological medicine,
psychosocial aspects of thedoctor-patient relationship and the distress of illness-for
that is what the practice of medicine has been about. Pragmatically, of course, many
of the relevant approaches to brain and behavior will have to be subsumed in courses
labeled "biological psychiatry." But this can invite distortions of what general
psychiatry-in its real span-utilizes and what basic science precisely perceives. And
it is no different a pedagogical dilemma than an undue focus on the psychology of
man which can ignore not only drives but the intrinsic bodily functions and limits of
psychological mechanisms.
Biological psychiatry is a term I've always disliked. It evokes an image of narrow
and rigid mechanisms as counterposed to a broad humanistic concern and philan-
thropic receptivity to the life of the mind. This is somehow viewed as opposed to the
mere molecular "machinery." The events in the engine room are seen as lacking in
both wonder and challenge to man's highest aspirations, and as serving only to power
the imagination and values of lofty staterooms above. That such distorted "human-
ism" can be the defensive slogan of the lazy, masking self-indulgence, and that
ignorance of design is an affront to the highest comprehension of the human
potential, is too often ignored.
In human biology, we don't, in any event, have a Society of Biological Internists,
although we recognize special emphases around organ systems or treatments.
Psychiatry today-as was the case 30 years ago for internal medicine-is now ready
for truespecialists in themajor disorders and treatments. Hopefully this will not be at
the expense of fragmenting its core unity. I would prefer, then, to preach what
Redlich so consistently practiced here: whatever areas of psychosocial or biological
inquiry enhance psychiatry's understanding of the regulation and development of
behavior is welcome and ofteaching interest-ifit is spiced with a healthy skepticism!
Further, it is impossible to conceive of human biology without concern for the
experience of the mind and the events of behavior, or of psychiatry without both.
Thus biological psychiatry without a behavioral science is as useless as a hammer
without an anvil-and if misapplied, perhaps as dangerous. So while psychiatrist-
investigators may spend a lifetime tracing specific molecular sequences, the ultimate
reference is to behavings. Nor in clinical science are the advent of pharmacotherapies
and various group therapies antagonistic developments. Although the means and
mechanisms are different, they both evoke brain operations involving attention,
arousal, and the phasings ofcognitive or interpersonal processes. I do not intend this
as a melioristic view; rather, it is essential to a basic biological viewpoint of man as a
part of nature.
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What we once called biological psychiatry has come out of the closet, not as a
perversion to skew our vision of human behavior, but as a part of the whole. That is
how I believe fundamentally it should be taught. And in goingfrom mind to brain, or
in teaching pharmacotherapeutics, there is no warrant for us to be mindless in
concepts or practice, or ignorant ofthe life ofthe socio-culturally tutored mind. Ifwe
indeed teach the neurobehavioral sciences in the context of other active psychiatric
developments and in conjunction with the preclinical sciences, our ability to educate
will occur in the general framework of medical education-of human biology-
whether at the pre- or postgraduate levels. The general climate of this effort of
medical education deserves some attention because it is highly relevant to what we, in
psychiatry, are educating for.
PROFESSIONAL DELEGITIMIZATION AND MEDICAL EDUCATION
What has always provided the attractiveness of medical careers is the tension
between knowledge and its application and the awesome challenge to therefore
exercise skilled judgment in the context of specific human need. But these polarities
of action and reflection also pose the problematics. There are today obvious
perturbations affecting professional roles and practices. In brief, both poles of the
dialectic of knowledge and action are simultaneously straining.
One pole is the explosion of knowledge. The other is a pressing focus on
distributive justice-on what to do for whom. Toumlin [1] has noted this in the aca-
demic disciplines as an intrinsic alternation between the substantive and technologi-
cal; concerns of how to do it and why and value concerns-for whom to do it. There
is an alternation between Truth and Justice, echoed in the arts and knowledge
disciplines as swings between the formal and the functional, the classic and the
romantic, the timeless and the temporal. Biomedicine clearly contains these swings
within it; thus the recurring tensions between preclinical and clinical sciences,
between education and training, science and its "doings" also reflect the knowledge-
action polarity.
Without cataloging the fundamental value confusions epitomized by the Guadala-
jara rule, few would question that we have for the moment, in broad public policy,
lost the balance between public interest, resource allocation and the art of the
possible as adjudicated both by scientific evaluation and responsible lay review. The
governance of adjudications in science and control over the disposition of its efforts
and products are different functions. But the contemporary regulatory and legislative
clamors strike not only at the very act of medical decision-making, but also at the
very value of knowledge and the social institutions necessary for any medical system
linked to the sciences. The evidentiary process is not identical with the law's
adversarial process, nor should we forget that Lysenkoism-imposed by autocrats or
by populists-can be the fate of the social institution we call science.
There are a variety of both serious and vulgarized belief systems challenging our
educative and professional sanction. These question who it is that should deliver
medical care and what the emphasis on medical care should be. Thus general
medicine is attacked because it is not exclusively preventive medicine; academic
centers, because they foster research and thereby raise expectations; and basic
biological and behavioral sciences, perhaps because new findings may expand costly
services, but-more disturbingly-because such effort is thought to distract us from
human services and social reform.
There is a real need to ration health care and shape public expectations on utilizing
expertise. But many are attempting to reduce consumer demand by enhancing
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mistrust, or by inventing counterfeit expertise or by diverting attention into various
fads and movements. We are thus witnessing a progressive "delegitimization" both of
medicine as a profession and its science base. Both lay cults and experts now promise
to reduce costs and to significantly impact morbidity and mortality by advocating or
legislating a frenzy of good hygiene and generalized abstinence.
Psychiatry predictably will then be invited to make people behave rather than to
develop and apply our burgeoning science base to the major psychoses and biobehav-
ioral dysfunctions. I see no evidence at all that the hard social-psychological research
that is necessary truly to understand the evolution ofpersonal orientations to disease
and discomfort, or in the utilization of"medicine men," is being programmed in the
current fad of "life-style." We will ever more frequently hear the call to summon the
"behavioral sciences" (whose success in changing the life-style of our youth, or drug
cultures, addicts and alcoholics has not been notable) to somehow bring forth their
wonders in enforcing compliance with "doctor's orders." Psychiatric and liaison
medicine have indeed learned something about the behavior and psychological infra-
structure of asthmatics, diabetics and many other chronically ill persons; the use of
treatment, or of groups and, especially, of self-help movements have been not
without value, even not without some savings in utilization of high cost medical
services. But none of these efforts are known to be so precise or potent in their effects
as to promise significantly to mitigate morbidity and mortality. Nor have decades of
effort to change the nutritional habits of "backward peoples" or child-rearing
practices been triumphs ofapplied "behavioral science." Indeed we know little about
the systematic application of ideology to change deeply rooted behavior, in spite of
the triumphs of advertising. So, in the name ofscience, we will hear expectations and
emphases which will divert us from fundamental research in the mental illnesses.
Further, the thrust will be thoroughly political and fundamentally will accompany
the move to a federally regulated "Health Vatican"-a Goebbels' Office of "Truth in
Health."
In brief, we can anticipate a continuation of the past decade's radical critiques of
contemporary biomedicine. The unifying thread in the new fad is the rejection ofthe
value of the special knowledge base rather than a balanced reflective view of the
appropriate way and places to apply it. David Musto [2] aptly described the lay cults
and radical movements, such as Thompsonism in the 19th century, challenging
professional medicine (and not without warrant, if one judges the knowledge base
and practices of 1850). The original "family practitioners" were books ofthe late 18th
and 19th centuries in which the mother and women were hailed as the useful service
deliverers; professionalism was angrily rejected in favor ofherbals, exercises and self-
help. The licensure laws in most of the states were repealed. Twentieth century
medicine-including psychiatry-must yet negotiate where special expertise, folk
expertise and the arts and accountabilities of educational, religious and welfare
institutions should play their role in the care of human ills. Nevertheless, there are
today a number of educated professionals and "health planners" echoing 19th
century anti-medicine.
Both serious and vulgarized belief systems are challenging professional educators
and the sanction of eduation. They emphasize the high costs anddangerous practices
of establishment medicine, if not its elitist and male dominated nature, and in one
guise or another seek a return to natural remedies and self-help. While most ofus can
see some very useful correctives in this, the rhetoric of both banal and serious
publications is caught in their titles: The End ofMedicine; The Death ofMedicine;
Pills, Profits and Politics; The Therapeutic Nightmare, and so on.
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No doubt technology and science have, in a supersonic transit of 30 years, brought
us to a bureaucratized and impersonalized medicine. For medical leadership, it has
had the consequences of a kind ofjet lag for those who began the trip. For medicine's
institutional arrangements, we can define a cultural lag. Neither academia nor our
practicing alumni have caught up with or innovated arrangements with which to keep
the balance between personalized care and the delivery of technically sophisticaed
services. Survival in that adversarial procedure of being a patient in a modern
medical center requires not only the skills ofmedical science, but a kind of Darwinian
primitive vigilance and wit. In mercy, we are all victims, so enmeshed within the
tangle that third parties are probably necessary for rescue. Yet as leaders struggle to
envision ambulatory and primary care as alternatives to the bureaucracies of
hospitals (in which we cannot distinguish who is striking, struck or stricken), there
may well be a confusion that it is simply and solely the site of training that is
equivalent to a sound core education in medicine. So what is at question is not only
our capacity to implement education, but the valuing ofit. And it is not at all clear as
to whether we will have to choose between the polarities ofeducating and vocational
training, rather than an artful conjunction of both.
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
We are indeed moving from a university definition of medical education to that of
the normal school. We are in the midst of a huge new ritualized industry of
continuing medical education and evaluation which is only a part ofthe "industriali-
zation" of academic medicine. It is a trend in which the exact sum of each of the
conceivably calculable parts is mistaken for the whole; in which the notion of
accountability is replaced by countability; and authenticity vouchsafed solely by a
syllabus. Credibility is no longer synonymous with creditability; rather than concern
with the categorical imperative, we are obsessed by the "category one" imperative!
Training has utility. But the invitation today is to substitute programmed devices
for education and to teach psychiatry in the burgeoning primary care area by
providing a ritual for drug treatment and a minimum of the necessary knowledge
base. There are many uses of "training" in the course ofeducation in human biology.
The growth of computer and information sciences, the application of behavioral
analysis and learning theories not only has advanced the neurobehavioral sciences
and experimentation, but has accompanied the kind of analyses of medical decision-
making which Feinstein has so probingly advanced for medicine. Psychiatry still
awaits this inquiry. Educators increasingly are attending to precise specification of
what they are about. Such devices help to teach us how we think, as well as to provide
computer programs, algorithms and other incremental aids to learning. Yet the
invitation today is to substitute devices for education and to machine a product in
terms solely of presumptive (short-sighted) service system needs. It is too soon to
know whether or not pharmacotherapeutics and psychodiagnostics, now so crucially
linked to therapy, can be wittingly or willingly applied by primary caretakers. If this
can occur, we will need fewer but far more highly educated psychiatric specialists.
That would very much change the level and focus of education!
Thus the need for a thoughtful approach to the transfer of knowledge from the
bench to bedside-so-called technology transfer-is clear. But the term is also a
Congressional code word proffered to afford an escape from special knowledge and
clinical judgments, and to contain costs. Some envision that in our culture we can
train as physicians an equivalent of the Maoist foot doctor who will implement the
single best average treatment for the average expectable disorder in an average
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dosage (legalistically enshrined in a piece ofreligious literature known as the Package
Insert). All of this will be determined by a few Congressionally sanctioned clinical
scientists who will be charged with "determining" the relative efficacy oftherapeutic
interventions, along with a potpourri of peerings by quasi-regulatory and consumer
bodies. However, whether or not medicine of necessity will be practiced by the
accountant's computer still leaves in place the unanswered question ofwhether we are
to cultivate and build a knowledge base for the clinical applier. We have, then, yet to
resolve the aim and limits for the education of the modal physician of the late 20th
century as we shift-and are not too subtly shifted-from professional to vocational
training.
The components ofmedical practice canindeed be rapidlytransmitted. Emergency
and Army medicine clearly demonstrated this. But the question is whether the
paraprofessional and primary professional receiving special training is a part of a
system in which competence boundaries are clear and in which patients might receive
some of the fruits of what can be delivered in the way of modern diagnosis and
treatments with some thread of personal accountability to the individual still
retained. It is most of all what is "in the head" of the skilled physician as he does or
refrains from doing with the patient-not his doings that comprises true professional-
ism. Valuing ofthis internalized knowledge and thejudgment it entails is at issue.
I mention this strain between education and vocational training because in our
solipsism psychiatry sometimes believes that its particular problems of establishing
special knowledge or of determining where in the phase of coping with human
ailments it is to be applied are unique. We in mental health have, ofcourse, observed
among mental health workers in various settings a veritable orgy ofrole transvestism
which clearly blurs what an education is all about. But when we see similar problems
of aim and definition of function confronting our mother disciplines in medicine, we
have reason to be concerned for the sanctioning of special knowledge.
Psychiatry, I am convinced, must be taught in the community of the clinical
disciplines and their basic sciences. But the uneasy link between service and the
generation and transmission of knowledge brings into question whether this can be
done. The service link today involves such massive cash flow issues as to make it
problematic whether universities will longtolerate this fiscal perplexity in their midst.
Action and reflection again pose polar tensions as provosts and presidents, basking
under the scientists' grant-contingent overhead lights, peer at their service budgets
and see red! Historically no university has been entirely comfortable with its medical
school. After all, doctors are people who, while ministering to misery, touch and
feel-at least once they did. For our academic colleague in the humanities, touching
inteaching might be turpitude-at least before the current crime ofchauvinism! So in
this uneasy perch, as we think of new emphases in psychiatric education, we must
confront the fact that there will probably only be a few university centers and
fortunate collections of opportunities, minds and purpose that characterize a
university school of medicine.
There is no question that we will emerge from this climate of clamor and
disarticulation of our perceptions of the rules of evidence and our valuing of it. We
will find some way for appropriate exchanges of competencies between interested
parties, be these the public and the profession or the educator and his student. Third
parties indeed may help mediate what all of us embedded in our institutions cannot
manage to provide alone. Trustees, committees and commissions-when values are
heeded and shared-have indeed accomplished this in the history oftransitions. Nor
will this Kierkegardian catalog of either/or, of thesis and antithesis, be without its
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resolutions. But during chaotic and distracting change, it is important to keep in high
focus the function and purpose of a professional education. One such function is to
mediate and regulate-for both individuals and their social systems-the intrinsic
tension between knowledge and its application, standing always on the side of
reflection no matter how the null point of this fundamental equation shifts with
circumstance.
This social function of education in regulating the tension between thought and
action is not dissimilar from other tutoring functions in human growth and
development. A part of the aim of medical education is thus a moral one. The aim is
for the student to learn in the context of supervised practice how to regulate himself
and in so doing how not only to utilize scientific information, but how to regard it
when it is not directly useful.
THE "OUT OF PHASE" GROWTH OF PSYCHIATRY
What I do find auspicious and unnoted in contemporary psychiatry-a develop-
ment "out of phase" with the decline in medical education-is the way in which both
its heritage and new developments are coalescing into a distinct emphasis on the
major psychoses and mental dysfunctions. The putative mid-19th-century father of
academic psychiatry-Wilhelm Greisinger-was thwarted in his academically cen-
tered design for coherent treatment systems. Using his qualifications as an internist
for sanction, he ensconced psychiatry within the medical school in Berlin, established
bedside teaching (an astonishing necessity to "introduce" the patient and the student-
clinician), and provided a clinical emphasis with wards and clinics. He designed half-
way houses and different arrangements within the community in the hope of dealing
specifically with the various distinct subpopulations which comprised psychiatric
work and posed different problems. But organized psychiatry in the rural state
hospitals opposed this academically centered coherent design for a differentiated
psychiatry.
The problem was-and to a great extent still is-that different populations,
conceptually important for psychiatry, are encountered in widely different settings, at
different phases of illness, dysfunction and recovery. The challenge for 150 years has
been to bring the necessary span ofinquiry and expertise to bear and to overcome the
relative isolation of clinical activity and inquiry from the scrutiny and assessment of
the academic sciences. Almost exactly
11 years ago [3], I noted that Yale was poised
to shift the balance between action and reflection through the Connecticut Mental
Health Center with both its service challenge and its research base. One could view
this shift as a realigning, in the light of modern requirements and knowledge, of the
balanced approach developed by Winternitz and the very concept he shared with
Hutchins, of an Institute of Human Relations. With the Yale Psychiatric Institute,
the West Haven Veterans Hospital programs and the General Hospital facilities, as
well as the Mental Health Center and its research in varied disciplines, Griesinger's
problem of a coherent and academically based system has come close to solution in
New Haven. One can both apply basic science and generate new knowledge with a
range of relevant populations accessible and in mind.
What is striking, and was not generally evident even 10 or 20 years ago, is the
distinct clinical focus in which the astonishing developments in the pharmacological
and brain sciences are meaningfully tested. The study of patients under treatment and
the study of major clinical dysfunctions, rather than of isolated case descriptions, are
now modal in the major academic centers. Psychobiological events both in individual
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patients and populations can now be noted and highly meaningful hypotheses tested.
This is matched by a new psychiatric epidemiology utilizing clinically relevant tools
and byfollow-up studies that are coupled to a new focus on diagnosis. With relatively
non-invasive procedures, the peripheral measures of hormones, amines, polypep-
tides, single fiber myography[4], supraspinal influence on peripheral motor neuron
action[5], eyetracking[6] or evoked potential analysis, all can be logically pursued in
the service of important questions bearing on disease and its treatment. What are
now known or knowable central neural or biochemical events can more frequently be
deduced by peripheral measures in man [7].
Most of the current measures in psychobiology reflect central drug actions, but
others are more directly revealing of asequence ofpathophysiological processes. Still
others, as traits and markers, are useful to studies of individuals at risk and for
pedigree analysis. Such work is useful in bringing more specific treatments-and
estimates of their efficacy-to specific subpopulations of depressed and schizo-
phrenic individuals. In brief, while the incidence of major dysfunctions has not
discernibly changed over 150 years, the appreciation and recognition of mental
dysfunctions, and some degree of specificity in their treatment and remarkable
success in preventing relapse, is indeed possible. And if measures of blood levels of
substrates and metabolites in man help-astheypromise to do-to guide and predict
therapy in specific patients, this too should be a major practical gain.
The agonizing irony, however, is that this more differentiated set of observations,
hypotheses and interventions has but recently become available because of the
momentum and investment begun 30 years ago, and in the current climate could be
readily abandoned. Psychiatry, somewhat later than Internal Medicine, now has the
need and capacity to subspecialize; one can even predict that the depressed patient
could be attended by-or receive consultation from-a psychiatric specialist in
depression rather than the renaissance generalist of the past. Thus at a time when
general medicine has to face its crises of over-specialization, the development of
psychiatry requires subspecialties. At the very time that social forces are retreating
from the generation of fundamental knowledge, the explosion of the brain sciences
and of skilled biobehavioral scientists with tasks to do on behalf of understanding the
mental illnesses require and merit the kind of confidence and support that was
forthcoming in the mid-50s for basic knowledge. In this perspective, our gains and
capacity to advance are truly out of phase with the times.
A PERSPECTIVE ON ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRIC KNOWLEDGE
This confluence of clinical investigations is based on four developments. One, as
noted, is in the arrangement of services. A second is a small cadre of trained
investigators who brought both ethical concern, clinical and therapeutic competence
and basic science skills to the research tasks. A third-and one often overlooked-is
our appreciable transgenerational store of experience in dealing intensively with a
wide range of troubled people and their families.
Forty years of psychodynamically centered activities with severely ill but often
ambulatory patients have brought us a perspective on thefunction of pathological
symptoms and their range of variability in different contexts. The intention of
psychiatrists in the 50s to come to know mentally ill individuals as people-not as
psychodynamic machines-has been overlooked. The ability to understand a wide
range of avoidance behaviors, and not only the subjective meaning of symptomatic
behavior, but its linkage to situations, persons and symbols, has enlarged our notion
of variability of symptoms and their potential for change. We can offer a keener
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assessment of the intensity and fixity or flexibility of only apparently similar
presenting problems than was modal 40 years ago. The ability to understand families
and the behaviors of various social groups when stress supervenes, as well as our
intensive probings of mental life, have provided more than the isolated snapshot of
disordered behavior as produced by the rigid, phenomenological mental status
examination.
This enhanced canniness about what lies behind and what might evolve from
symptomatic behavior represents the beginnings of an eventual psychosocial "anat-
omy and physiology" of behavior disorder. The propositionthat behavior is multiply
determined, and the observations of subjective motivational meanings and dynamics
attached to all experience, does not, of course, mean that we necessarily, through a
glimpse of these processes, always gain significant leverage that is effective for
behavior change or the prevention of disorder. Rather, it tells us something of the
inevitable functioning of mental life. When we see a patient with pyrexia and right
lower quadrant rebound tenderness, we do not insert a probe into the hypothalamus
because that is where physiology has taught us that temperature is regulated, but
diagnose appendicitis with an understanding ofthe mechanism ofthefebrile reaction.
Our intervention is proximal and pragmatic, and not a rote replication ofphysiologi-
cal facts. And so it is with applications of psychological "anatomy and physiology."
We can better identify and assess symptoms and direct our psychological interven-
tions with a better sense oftheir goal and limited utility. Today there is also a greater
emphasis on delineating differences that make a difference, on observation and
testing of hypotheses, and on understanding the conditions in which psychological
mechanisms operate. What is critical is that these "conditions" frequently are the
biological referents of behavior, and manipulation ofthem an increasingly important
therapeutic target which ultimately facilitates the acquisition of optimal psychologi-
cal functioning.
The dynamic schools of psychiatry also taught us that pausing for self-knowledge
in the context of reflective one-to-one relationships could be one of man's adaptive
techniques, and a wide range ofcontemporary interventions either owe much to their
psychoanalytic origins and do not admit it, or call themselves psychoanalytic when
they are actually quite derivative. It is above all clear that the discovery of the
transference has been important to the training of psychiatrists. Indeed its inevitabil-
ity is an adaptive trait providing not only the potential for growth and treatment, but
for nurturance and aid in moments of stress and phases ofdependence-and hence is
intrinsic to the doctor-patient relationship. I believe it takes several generations to
master and sift through the utility of discoveries that reflect on or derive from
subjective experience, and especially to learn how to teach and utilize them well and
appropriately in psychiatry.
So today we do not advocate practicing the 50-minute hour with each patient,
while we hopefully can still teach with"one-to-one." We do not confuse the treatment
modality with etiology, or psychotherapy with psychogenesis. Indeed, Redlich's
recent re-visit to his classic 1950 study (and I doubt ifhefully realizes that the results
reflect the accomplishments of his stewardship at Yale) showed, in actual fact, that a
shorter, problem-oriented approach, with drugs as needed to help the patient to
manage, is modal practice. Thus we expect today's student to differentially diagnose
the condition as far as this is possible, but also to diagnose the person with the
disorder; his situation; his resources; his preferred mode oflearning, and-with these
variables in mind-to design treatments which best accord with what is possible.
If in teaching basic biological sciences or diagnosis we do not keep human
125DANIEL X. FREEDMAN
psychology in mind, we, of course, will be brokers for a particular position-selling
futures on ideologies when we are asked simply to describe both our information and
our ignorance. Nor do I see this as a fragmented eclecticism, but as a coherent mode
of approach in which several frames of reference must be kept in mind. At the same
time there is no retreat from precision of thought and action. Psychiatrists must
increasingly anticipate specificity for disorders; they can no longer afford to fail to try
to distinguish depression from senility or manic disorders from schizophrenia.
The fourth factor derives from advances in biobehavioral sciences applied as
psychopharmacological developments. Many puzzles and perplexities surely lie
before us. We have only one partially specific anti-manic drug. Chemotherapy of the
psychoses utilizes compounds active in both organic and schizophrenic psychoses.
Anti-depressants, though efficacious, are not uniformly so, nor at all satisfactory in
their speed of action. While proud and pleased, we cannot be too self preening with
these applications. But the current advances in diagnosis and treatment are real in
their consequences to patients.
The truly fundamental engine in developing these clinical investigations is the basic
science advances. Pharmacotherapies have compelled belief that brain chemistry
must be relevant either to the etiology of mental disorder (although there is no proof)
or, at least, to reparative functions-which is true. But what is astonishing is a new
domain, a universe of transactions that can be investigated within the brain,
providing a biologically coherent logic for pursuit-rather than belief. It is this
fundamental knowledge base in brain sciences, linked to physiology, pharmacology
and behavioral sciences, that holds such promise for our future ability to deal
saliently and rationally with clinical disorders.
BRAIN SCIENCES IN PSYCHIATRY
We do not as yet in fact know how far we can legitimately expect to go in
comprehending mental disorder or its intrinsic rates of change. We do not know how
far downstream from more primary events our current measures of brain function in
disease are tapping, or whether we must seek separate factors as determining the
occasion and other factors in the form of the psychosis-schizophrenic or
depressive-and still others for the maintenance or intensity of symptomatology, or
whether (as Griesenger believed) we deal with one rather than with many psychotic
disorders. Nor do we know why we cannot as yet predict the specific person, even
within high risk groups, who will become actually ill, or why we cannot as yet
recognize the formes frustes of adult disorder; is it our imperception or because of
inadequate fundamental knowledge? We can and have launched longitudinal and
prospective studies with biopsychological measures of infants at high risk and we
already can identify semi-independent dimensions of behavior that enable us to more
sharply differentiate amongst the various psychoses-premorbid status, presenting
phenomenology, and social and functional outcome.
And we have tantalizing glimpses into the future. In an extension of the various
molecular coding systems which carry out their chores at some distance from the
grand double helical design, we now know of polypeptides such as endorphins the
body's opiates. Other receptors specific for valium-related compounds may provoke
a search for endogenous substances related to intrinsic defences against anxiety and
dysphoria. Another tack is the recognition that morphine-or lobotomy-produce
an indifference to internal signals of pain. Are there neocortically linked pathways
whereby endogenous or synthetic peptides could produce "indifference" to the
internal noise and static to which the psychotic so intensely attends? In brief, new
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ways to arrive at rearrangements of internal regulations may be found. But tempting
as such futurism may be, our current focus on neuroregulatory substances remain to
be articulated with the morecomplex arrangements ofthe"triune brain" ofMacLean.
That brain is built to behave. Its ongoing behavioral disposition and activity is the
key to the influence ofthe next signal or input forwhich sensorimotor systems are set
or prepared. So-called corollary discharge tells us that overt responses have been
internally signalled (to central sensorimotor control systems) before or just as the
behavior emerges. And it's best we teach a healthy wariness ofconceiving ofjuices as
necessarily "forcing" behavioral states upon these ongoing neuronal systems. Precise
lesions depleting cortex or hypothalamus of norepinephrine do not affect the
regulation of sleep, sleep phases or activation. Amines may influence the quality of
linkage, organization and timing-and hence the intensity-of behaviors and hence
their adaptive efficiency; this does not mean that regulation of basic functions won't
occur in their absence. Onejuice-one disease is not likely. Although we know ofdrugs
that may reliably produce a model psychosis, and of enzymes in man that can
produce psychotogens, I know of no synthetic or endogenous molecules-including
reserpine-that directly and reliably produce a model depression.
We should thus teach that there may be changes in current dogma-our working
hypotheses and metapharmacology-remembering that amphetamine was once a
model anti-depressant and currently is a model for schizophrenia; postencephalitic
Parkinsonism was an organic model for schizophrenia and current dopamine
blockade therapy would have us postulate Parkinsonism as antithetical to schiz-
ophrenia. If we today teach well, we need not in the future be caught with our
categories down! What is clear is that neuronal assemblies can be studied. Behavior-
ally relevant basic processes (inhibition, habituation, sensitization, adaptation, and
rate control) and regulation of behavioral associations and dissociations, can be
increasingly approached. What we can learn about the fundamental dimensions of
overt behaviors can be as startling as past discoveries in depth psychology and neural
science.
THE BIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT IN PSYCHIATRY
Now in spite of my title and charge, it should be obvious that I do not intend a
paean of praise for the range of exciting developments in what is called biological
psychiatry. Rather, in this broad but growingly coherent base of pragmatically
oriented psychiatry, there has been a wide range ofrelevant investigatory thrusts, and
I see biological viewpoints, as well as biological discoveries, as a unifying ratherthan
fragmenting force. Most of our academic forefathers indeed had a major fascination
with themind/body problem: how living matter can accommodate the links ofbodily
function, subjective experience and overt behavior. The link of nerves, humors, acts
and objects can today be found in a wide array ofstudies inexperimental biopsychol-
ogy, which might help reveal how controls within the brain are organized and linked
to the behaving organism and its environmental nutriments. In a deeper sense, this
has been the concern of general biology: to establish links between molecules and
behaviors, studying the codes which produce the modalities through which the
environment shapes biological destiny. General biology is concerned with the
adaptation of populations. Those of us who study individuals, raphe nuclei and
projections, or Aplysia, are similarly interested in adaptation and in a range of
responses based not only on predesigned programs-Lorenz's "internal school-
marms"-but on the information conveyed by the environment.
All biology is thus insolubly linked to a transactional and developmental view of
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behavior: from evolution to embryology, from the ontogenesis of behavior to
complex problems of behavior change [8]. We can no longer afford not to appreciate
the manifold of nature and nurture, nor to be distracted by fears of reductionism.
Perhaps we could borrow the wisdom of Pascal. He wondered why learning-the
acquisition of habit-was not natural. And he answered that nature itself was only
first habit, while habits are second nature. In our attempts to understand individual-
ity (rather than solipsistically celebrate its subjective manifestations), we can see that
it is the very tools of nature that provide for the variability we cherish. The study of
isolated systems has shown that it is the very design of the way we are prewired and
genetically coded or preset that requires individual differences as well as the
operation of environmental events for the realization of genetic potential. Similarly,
it is mainly in studies of isolated assemblies that, in constructional analysis, the brain
reveals itself. From such banal witnesses as fossils, peas, bacteria and fruit flies we
construct our knowledge of molecular biology. So the study of design and adaptation
of living organisms, their concomitant balance of stability and change, the givens of
nature and their peculiar skew towards efficient flexibility for adaptation, is our
business.
These views emerge in part out of 19th century physiology and philosophy-from
Bernard and from Bergson-and have evolved today to what is known as structural-
ism or control and regulation theory, or systems theory and the like. In brief,
concepts that use the idea of holism-of the integration and coordination and goal
seeking and setting of the component parts-are variations of this basic theme. The
rules are that the state of the organism changes but not the laws it obeys; the
organism-through its mechanisms-tends always towards equilibrium. Regulatory
structures are given and so situated as to evolve. They exist to diminish rather than
aggravate perturbation, and hence tend towards persistence, redundancy and stabil-
ity and permit change in the service of this function. With perturbation, the organism
regulates itself to move somehow from the disturbance, and with feedback systems to
construct new set points and new equilibria if necessary. Thus when we are studying
amine levels, or the metabolites in urine, CSF and blood, we are catching a snapshot
of a system of regulated equilibria with their compensatory processes, rather than a
unidirectional response to perturbation.
Freud in his Project understood the nervous system similarly as consisting of
contrivances for transforming external quantity to quality in the service both of
survival and minimized perturbation. The transduction of energy and information at
the synapse-this change of state-indeed is where modern physiology directly meets
the mind/ body problem, a change from one state to the next. Regulatory structures
evolve in transactions. For Freud, the explanation of vivid states, hysteria dreams
and forgetting provided the text through which the operations of these basic
biological regulatory principles could be constructed [9]. Sherrington, Eccles and
Sperry have also utilized both clinical and experimental data for such models of the
control systems through which bodily and environmental needs can be transacted.
All try to build a picture of a brain that can conform to the requirements of analyzed
behavior. And since Hughlings Jackson, some hope to learn from the operations of
brain what components of behavior should more fruitfully be analyzed!
This general mode of biological thought and design extends to our clinical work as
well. We see symptoms not necessarily as givens, but as reactions; schizophrenic
symptoms as restitutive attempts to cope after some prior and as yet unknown
rupture or injury. We can look at depressive agitation-the escalatingly intense self
castigation-as some thwarted attempt on the part of the organism to mobilize itself
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and reduce immobilizing pain. Our various therapies-from getting the patient angry
to drug effects-all aim at the mobilization of the patient into goal directed activity.
Physiological and behavioral systems are not static.
Nor should we forget advances in the behavioral sciences. Given the human's
intrinsic developmental lags, Freud saw thespecifics ofa neurosis as ultimately based
on two factors: "intensity," or factors related to reception ofinput-and "accidental"
factors-environmental events. Their timing was crucial. And today conditioning
theories are teaching us the importance of so-called "incidental reinforcers" that
somehow are so coupled with ongoing behaviors as to lead to maladaptive and
entrenched behavior-polydypsia and colitis, for example. The determinants of
behaviors that become inflexible or entrenched are not at all well understood. But it
is clear that in its disposition to behave, organisms-say a rat working on a simple
schedule of reinforcement-can reliably learn these apparently maladaptive re-
sponses. It appears that chance-induced events, because of their timing, somehow
create reinforcement set points-these then become the determinants of what the
behavior is behaving for. Thus while often the behavioral reinforcer can be readily
empathized and identified, we know that with certain manipulations animals will
work very hard to receive electric shock to the feet. We know that humans too
manifest rigidities and often incomprehensible repetitive behaviors. For the masoch-
ist, it may be that the unconscious guilt and cathartic indignation are secondary to
other aims around which the behavior is organized. Perhaps it is not the bruise, but
the reliable evocation of the loss of control of the aggressorwhich is reinforcing. For
the addict, the ability to self-administer from moment-to-moment is a mastery which
transcends the obvious damaging consequences around which behavior can be
powerfully organized. The point is that many such regulations require an objective
analysis of behavior to discern their presence and role, however their subjective
elaborations are construed. In behavior therapies we know we can treat symptoms as
dysfunctions in their own right and that with analysis ofthe contingencies sustaining
the symptom, whatever our ignorance of the origins of behavior, we can help the
patient gain momentum that competence and mastery bring, as well as gaining
symptom relief. In brief, we know that we learn from many modalities, our muscles
as well as our head, as well as our reflection on the backlog of experience. What we
do not know are the various timing and other dimensions which account for the
apparently meaningless and powerful and often inflexible patterning of entrenched
behavior in both man and animal.
Thus amongthe proximal and distal causative events, it is important to know those
which operate under non-intuited rules-march to a "different drummer"-and
equally crucial to understand the weight to ascribe to the multiple factors regulating
behavior. Man's ability to institute remedial action through organic or psychosocial
invention and intervention does not directly correlate, of course, with establishing
etiological sequences or preventive measures. We can establish new equilibria; we do
not "reverse" what is past[8]. In psychodynamic terms we speak ofseeking structural
change, and in pharmacodynamic terms of establishing new set points. Digitalis
affects the force of cardiac contraction, but analysis of its action does not directly
lead us to nor reverse the initial causes of decompensation. The triumph of the
aphasic who learns new approaches to utilizing language (and thereby teaches us
about the nature, limits and potential of brain processes in language) is no less noble
an achievement than the schizophrenic who, with pharmacotherapy, can learn
sufficient self-mastery to cope and satisfy some human longings (while teaching us
more about the conditions and operations that permit the willful deployment of
1293 DANIEL X. FREEDMAN
attention in affectional and social contexts). In this general approach, a posture of
advocacy rather than inquiry can produce future decades of ignorance in our
attempt to comprehend what Percy Bridgeman once called "the way things are." In
that comprehension lies the true power and perspective of change in biobehavioral
and cultural development.
THE COMPREHENSION OF MIND
It is the destiny of ontogenesis that we are built to "know" more than we can
explicate, to mean more than we can convey; we thus have language intrinsically built
for metaphor. Such mentalistic language must be used initially to understand brain
and behavior. But in the sequential educational process by which we transcend our
givens, we intend to understand the language of brain processes. Thus the brain has a
mind of its own! Molecules speak in coded language to molecules, and membranes to
membranes, and so forth. So we will do no favor to talk about our drugs as mood
changers when we know that they are affecting cognitive, rate and perceptual
processes, nor to hint at luridly specific behavioral control when we know that we
deal always with transactional and state-dependent processes. And we know that
drugs affect stop and start mechanisms, affect thresholds that change the rate and
range of signals to which the nervous system responds. This is a far cry from a sole
focus on mood or on malevolent behavioral control. We do not have a clockwork
orange, not even a clockwork lemon! We do not aim to be controllers of behavior in
any event, but rather to enhance self-regulation. In brief, we know, from what we
already know of brain function, that there is a kind of order which underlies complex
behaviors as it does in the simpler systems with which biology can demonstrate
mechanisms. In this sense, reductionism allows-when the sequence of control
mechanisms can be described and identified-a clearer understanding of how it is we
behave the way we do.
There is much in modern biology to unify our basic approach in psychiatry,
whatever our special focus. Many or all of these approaches can teach us something
about the limits and nature of material systems through which information is
exchanged and coded. I have tried toemphasize that in teaching this we are not losing
but gaining in our comprehension of mind. Medawar has referred to the days before
empirical truthfulness was thought to be either a necessary or desirable characteristic
of professedly factual statements. That we now must seriously attend to factual
statements does not mean that they comprehend all of truth, or all of the truth we
want to know; nor all the facets ofapprehended experience we need to know to tell a
truthful story. It is simply that they are a necessary beginning.
So we all face our commonalities with impersonal forces which determine our
behavior along with that of the rest of the living species, and yet we seek personal
meaning in our brief transit. This tension between biology and the psychology of the
self has haunted the history ofpsychiatry but lies developmentally within each of us
[10]. Our problem has been how to rescue the dignity and uniqueness of man for
ourselves and our patients, while thoroughly appreciating the descriptions of
impersonal biosocial processes-realities that we do not directly apprehend. Insofar
as a true behavioral science is requisite for mankind's survival in the 21st century and
beyond, this comprehension will be increasingly necessary. It will be if we truly are to
transcend our ignorance of man and his limits, and hence realize how to achieve our
potential. Piaget described the child's developing grasp of reality as he moves from
egocentrism and begins to perceive of himself as an "event among related events."
And it is in that relational context that the new biobehavioral emphases in psychiatric
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education must continue. It can do so exactly on the generative template of inquiry,
imaginative curiosity, and skepticism (i.e., modesty) that Fritz Redlich constructed
at Yale.
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